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In California personal jurisdiction over nonresident individuals
is restricted by statute to several limited situations. California's
broadest jurisdictional provision provides that a nonresident is sub-
ject to the court's power if he was a resident at the time the cause of
action arose, at the time of service of process, or at the time the
action is commenced.2 By judicial construction the "resident" must
be a domiciliary of the state.3 In addition, nonresident motorists4
and fliers' may be reached under special jurisdictional statutes. Of
course, a defendant's actual presence within the state when he is per-
sonally served6 or his valid consent will enable the court to assert
personal jurisdiction. However, the improbability of either of these
circumstances leaves them minor bases for assuming jurisdiction
over nonresidents. With the exception of the motorists and fliers
provisions, this statutory scheme permits the assertion of jurisdiction
over nonresidents in relatively infrequent and unlikely situations.
In contrast, both Illinois and New York have significantly ex-
panded their power over nonresidents through the enactment of com-
prehensive long-arm statutes.7 A similar California statute has
been proposed by the Lawyers Club of San Francisco.' The proposal
1 Foreign partnerships may also be subject to California jurisdiction. CAL. CoRP.
CODE § 15700 (West 1955). However, the court's power extends only to the entity,
not the individual partners. Lewis Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 245,
295 P.2d 145 (1956). For an excellent summary of present jurisdictional bases in
California see Horowitz, Bases of Jurisdiction oj California Courts to Render Judg-
ments Against Foreign Corporations and Nonresident Individuals, 31 S. CAL. L. REV.
339 (1958).
2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 417 (West 1954).
3 Owens v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. 2d 822, 345 P.2d 921 (1959).
4 CAL. VEH. CODE § 17451 (West Supp. 1968).
5 'CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21414 (West 1965).
6 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7 Ii. ANN. STAT. C. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1956); N.Y. Civ. PaAc. LAW
§ 302 (McKinney Supp. 1968) ; for an outline of similar provisions see note 8 infra.
See also WASH. REV. CODE § 4.29.185 (1962), N.M. ANN. Civ. CODE § 21-3-16 (Supp.
1967).
8 Sec. 418(a). Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state,
who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter
enumerated, does thereby submit said person, and if an individual, his per-
sonal representative, to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state as to any
cause of action arising from the doing of any of said acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this state;
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would add a new provision, section 418, to the Code of Civil Pro-
cedure and would amend sections 411 and 417. Proposed section
418(a) sets out those events which would constitute a sufficient
relationship with the state to enable California courts to obtain juris-
diction over a nonresident. The courts could assert jurisdiction if
the nonresident defendant transacts any business within the state;
commits a tort within the state; or owns, possesses, or uses any real
or personal property within the state. Jurisdiction is likewise ob-
tained when the defendant contracts to insure any person, property,
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this state;
(3) The ownership, possession or use of any real or personal property
situated in this state;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this
state at the time of contracting or which, it is known or reasonably
should be known to the insurer, will be transferred to this state during
such period as such contract will be in force;
(5) The sale of goods, wares or merchandise to persons within this state.
Sec. 418(b). Only causes of action arising from acts enumerated herein may
be asserted against a defendant in an action in which jurisdiction over him
is based upon this section.
Sec. 418(c). Service of process upon any person who is subject to the
jurisdiction of the courts of this state, as provided in this section, may be
made by personally serving the summons upon the defendant outside this
state and such service shall be of the same force and effect as though sum-
mons had been personally served within this state providing, however, that
nothing contained herein limits or affects the right to serve any process in any
other manner now or hereinafter provided by law.
Sec. 411.3. If the suit is against a minor, under the age of 14 years, residing
"thin this •tats: o such minor, personally, and also to his
father, mother or guardian; or if there be none within this state,
then to any person having the care or control of such minor, or
with whom he resides, or in whose service he is employed.
4. If the suit is against a person residing within thi& tate arn for
whom a guardian or conservator has been appointed: to such
person, and also to his guardian or conservator.
Sec. 417. Where jurisdiction is acquired over a person who is outside of this
state by publication of summons in accord with Sections 412 and 413, the
court shall have the power to render a personal judgment against such
person only if he was personally served with process and was a resident of
this state (a) at the time of the commencement of the action or (b) at the
time that the cause of action arose or (c) at the time of service or was a
person who came within the provisions of Section 418 of this code. (Pro-
posed new language in italics.)
Lawyers Club of San Francisco, Conference Resolution No. 28, 1968. (Copy on file in
office of Santa Clara Lawyer). The 1964 Conference Resolutions Nos. 30, 31, and 32
concerning the scope of consent to service of process for nonresident motorists formed
the basis for the 1967 amendments to Vehicle Code section 17451, supra note 4.
Conference Resolution No. 28 seeks to extend to other subjects the same advantages
now granted in cases involving operation of foreign motor vehicles in California.
This proposed statute differs from the Illinois and New York long-arm statutes
in that section 418(a) (5) is unique to California; also, in this statute the nonresident
insurer is subject to California jurisdiction if he insures a person or thing which he
knows will be brought into California. The Illinois statute has a clause which subjects
a nonresident Illinois' jurisdiction in a divorce proceeding if he has maintained a
matrimonial domicile in the state or committed the act which give rise to the divorce
proceeding in that state. New York has a clause which comprehensively covers the
commission of a tortious act extrastate where the injury occurs within the state, see
note 34 inlra.
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or risk which is located or will be located within the state, or if he
sells any goods, wares, or merchandise to persons situated in the state.
The statute would limit jurisdiction to causes of action arising from
the jurisdictional events enumerated above, and the due process
notice requirements would be fulfilled by out-of-state service of
process.9
This comment will outline the jurisdictional boundaries of sim-
ilar long-arm statutes in other states with particular emphasis
placed on the troublesome problem of the nonresident individual
defendant.' An examination of the significant extension of juris-
dictional power which would result from enactment of section 418
will indicate the compulsion for adopting a modern basis of juris-
diction in California. Since the due process limitation on extrastate
jurisdiction has been amply discussed," if not talked to death, 2 it
will only be mentioned where state courts have incorporated the con-
stitutional standard as a rule of construction for their statutory
provisions.
TRANSACTION OF ANY BUSINESS
While the Illinois and New York courts use differing language
in construing the limits to which they are willing to extend juris-
diction under the "transaction of business" clause of their long-arm
statutes, it appears that both courts reach the same conclusion when
faced with a similar factual situation.
Earlier Illinois decisions required as an essential prerequisite
to jurisdiction the nonresident's presence within the state at the time
the business event occurred. In one decision, the court refused juris-
diction because a distributorship contract, the basis for the suit,
9 "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958),
requires that there must be some action through which the defendant purposefully
avails himself of the privilege of conducting activities with the state, thus invoking the
benefits of its laws. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction,
73 H~Av. L. REV. 909 (1960) ; F. JAMEs, CIVIL PROCEDURE 643 (1965).
10 The problem of obtaining jurisdiction over nonresident corporate defendants
is excluded from this discussion since the Supreme Court has held that the only limita-
tion is "due process." This would be the ultimate restriction on any statute; see cases
:ited note 9 supra.
11 Developments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction. 73 Hxv. L. REv. 909
(1960) ; F. JAMES, CIvIL PROCEDURE 611-72 (1965).
12 For example, the most recent hound volume of the Index to Legal Periodicals




was signed outside the state and neither the defendant nor his agents
were present in Illinois. 3 Accordingly, jurisdiction was sustained
where the defendant entered the state to inspect machinery he had
purchased from the plaintiff.14 Subsequent cases, however, now
make it clear that Illinois will sustain jurisdiction where the business
transaction consisted merely of a sale to an Illinois resident without
the defendant ever having entered the state. In 1965, a federal court
applying Illinois law sustained jurisdiction over a nonresident
defendant when the evidence indicated that he had merely solicited
business and shipped food into Illinois.'
However, the requirements of due process impose a perimeter
beyond which a sufficient jurisdictional base does not exist. Thus, in
an action based on the sale of stock, where the negotiations occurred
in Illinois but neither party intended to invoke the benefit of Illinois
law, the defendant's contact with the state was not sufficient to sup-
port jurisdiction."
While jurisdiction in Illinois is limited only by the requirements
of due process 7 the New York courts deny any legislative intent to
extend their long-arm statute to its outermost bounds. They theoret-
ically limit the exercise of jurisdiction to situations where the plain-
tiff has shown that a purposeful relationship exists between the
defendant and the state.' 8
Nevertheless, the New York decisions appear almost as liberal
as Illinois'. A New York court found a sufficiently purposeful trans-
action where the defendant negotiated a service contract in New
York supplemental to a contract for sale of machinery executed
elsewhere and pursuant thereto sent two engineers into the state to
maintain the machinery.' 9 In another case,2" jurisdiction was upheld
although the defendant never entered the state. His purposeful rela-
13 Grobark v. Addo Machine Co., 18 IUl. App. 2d 10, 151 N.E.2d 425 (1958);
aff'd, 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959).
14 Kropp Forge Co. v. Jawitz, 37 Ill. App. 2d 475, 186 N.E.2d 76 (1962).
15 Continental Nut Co. v. Robert L. Berner Co., 345 F.2d 395 (7th Cir. 1965)
(Defendant failed to deny allegations of solicitation and shipment of goods within
Illinois).
16 Kaye-Martin v. Broke, 267 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1959). See also Koplin v. Saul
Lerner Co., 52 Ill. App. 2d 97, 201 N.E.2d 763 (1964).
17 Nelson v. Miller, 11 IR. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957). See also Koplin v.
Thomas Haab & Boots, 73 Ill. App. 2d 242, 219 N.E.2d 646 (1966).
18 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reineche Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
209 N.E.2d 68 (1965); there are three cases decided under this one title; Longines-
Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reineche Inc., Feathers v. McLucas, Singer v.
Walker.
19 Id. at 443, 209 N.E.2d at 68.
20 Id. at 464, 209 N.E.2d at 80.
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tion with New York consisted of mailing advertisements into the
state and later shipping his product to a New York dealer.
Because of California's restricted jurisdictional statutes cover-
ing nonresident individual defendants, a local court lacks the
authority to obtain jurisdiction when confronted with situations
similar to those outlined above. In one California decision service
of process in Canada was held ineffectual to secure jurisdiction over
the nonresident for his fraudulent representations made in California
to the plaintiffs during the course of a land sale transaction.2' Like-
wise, in another case the defendant, a resident of Nevada, was held
not subject to the California courts in a suit concerning a promissory
note he executed here.22 Again, an action concerning the cancellation
of benefits under a pension plan was dismissed because the court
could not obtain jurisdiction over nonresident members of the pen-
sion committee.2"
Code of Civil Procedure section 411 allows the court to assume
jurisdiction over nonresident corporations doing business in this
state.24 The California Supreme Court has broadly construed the
term "doing business" and has imposed only those limitations re-
quired by due process.25 This, together with the impetus generated
by the liberal Illinois and New York decisions, indicates that pro-
posed section 418 would be construed to its constitutional limits.
Were this section to become law, a California court would no longer
be forced to refuse jurisdiction simply because a defendant who
executed a note in this state is not a resident. Similarly, a nonresi-
dent defendant who makes fraudulent representations in California
concerning the sale of local land would also be required to defend
in California. 6
Under present law there is no protection for the California
citizen who deals with a nonresident individual. It seems ludicrous
that a nonresident flier involved in an airplane accident is amenable
to suit"' while the same person, were he to enter a contract with a
resident of the state, could escape all liability here for the transac-
tion.
21 Martens v. Winder, 341 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1965).
22 Josephson v. Superior Court, 219 Cal. App. 2d 354, 33 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1963).
28 Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 239, 39 Cal. Rptr. 753
(1964).
2 CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. § 411 (West 1954).
25 Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 347, 347 P.2d 1 (1959).
26 This is not to say that the court would have definitely exercised jurisdiction in
these particular situations, but jurisdiction would not have been refused merely be-
cause defendants were not residents of California within the meaning of Code of
Civil Procedure section 417.
27 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21414 (West 1965).
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California has a long history of progressive legislation and yet
it is possible for a nonresident tourist to carry on business while
temporarily vacationing in California and completely escape the
authority of our courts by making a convenient exit. In keeping
with this progressive spirit California ought to afford its residents
the constitutionally permissible power to reach nonresident defen-
dants who have wronged California citizens. Code of Civil Procedure
section 418 will give the courts this power.
COMMISSION OF A TORTIOUs ACT
In 1957 Illinois adopted a most liberal construction of section
17 of the Illinois Civil Practice Act, the prototype for modern long-
arm provisions. That statute's enactment, as interpreted by the state
supreme court, reflected a conscious purpose to assert jurisdiction
over nonresidents to the extent permitted by due process. 28 The land-
mark decision sustained extension of the state's process to reach a
nonresident merchant whose employee had delivered a stove to an
Illinois resident in the ordinary course of business when the latter
sued for personal injury resulting from the negligent delivery of
the stove. Thus a single act of ordinary business which resulted in
injury to a resident was a sufficient "contact" to form a basis of
jurisdiction. 29 While the defendant may have been "transacting busi-
ness" within the meaning of the statute, the court apparently sanc-
tioned jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant's "tortious act."8"
If a similar situation were to arise in California, the court would
lack the requisite statutory authority to serve the defendant, since
he would not be a resident within the meaning of section 417 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
Post-Nelson v. Miller3°a cases in Illinois and other states have
focused on the problem of determining where the "tortious act" was
committed. Illinois has construed the tortious act to be the place
where the last event occurs which renders the defendant liable. One
case involved an out-of-state corporate defendant which manufac-
tured safety valves. In the course of its business the corporation sold
the valves to another extrastate manufacturer who assembled them
on his waterheaters and then sold the heaters to retailers. Plaintiff
purchased a heater and was injured by an explosion due to defen-
dant's defective safety valve. Jurisdiction was sustained since the
28 Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957).
29 F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE 645 (1965).




court construed "tortious act" to include not only the wrong but
also the resultant injury, here caused by the explosion.31
On the other hand, New York and Washington, interpreting
statutes similar to Illinois', were unwilling to sustain that state's
position. In a somewhat similar factual situation, New York decided
that an extrastate act cannot be changed into an intrastate act sim-
ply because the injury occurred within the state. In that case a gas
tank, manufactured by the nonresident, was fitted onto a truck and
subsequently exploded while traveling through New York. 2 A Wash-
ington court was also unwilling to extend jurisdiction to a situation
where only the injury occurred within the state. The defendant, an
Oregon automobile dealer, sold a car to an Oregon resident who was
injured when the car malfunctioned in Washington. The court felt
defendant had no intention of benefiting from the laws of the state
of Washington when he sold the car, and that it would be inequita-
ble to assume jurisdiction over a defendant in such a situation.-"
However, after the New York decisions, the state legislature
modified the long-arm statute so as to conform to the Illinois rule.
It now appears that the courts would have to sustain jurisdiction
even in a case where personal injury is the only jurisdictional event
alleged .3
4
In two California decisions the court had to refuse jurisdiction
where the wrongful conduct apparently occurred extrastate. In the
first decision plaintiff suffered an injury when a bowling ball fell off
31 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Il. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961).
82 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reineche, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443,
458, 209 N.E.2d 68, 76 (1965).
33 Oliver v. American Motors Corp., 17 Wash. 2d 870, 425 P.2d 647 (1967);
Gray was distinguished on the basis that the defendant in Gray was a manufacturer
while in Oliver the defendant was merely a dealer. The court felt it was reasonable
for a manufacturer to foresee interstate transportation of his goods, but felt this was
not a reasonable assumption on the dealer's part. Since Washington and Oregon
have a long contiguous border, the reasonableness of this rationale is questionable.
However, there was apparently no contact with the state of Washington other than
the fact that the malfunction and injury occurred there; no other motorists were
involved in the accident.
34 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney Supp. 1968), amending N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. LAW § 302 (McKinney 1963). The added portion reads,
3. commits a tortious act without the state causing injury to person or
property within the state, except as to a cause of action for defamation of
character arising from the act, if he(i) regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other per-
sistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used
or consumed or services rendered in the state, or
(ii) expects or should reasonably expect the act to have consequences




a return rack manufactured by the defendant, a citizen of Washing-
ton."6 In the later action a container of drain cleaner exploded when
a plumber mixed it with another solution while trying to repair
plaintiff's pipes.36 In both of these cases jurisdiction was refused be-
cause the individual defendants were not residents of the state.
Clearly California bases jurisdiction on domicile rather than the
commission of a tort.37 Had these cases arisen under proposed sec-
tion 418 the results certainly would have been different since both
New York and Illinois would assume jurisdiction in such situations."s
California also has nonresident motorists39 and fliers 40 statutes
which subject indviduals to the state's jurisdiction when they are
involved in an accident resulting from the use of their car or plane
within this state. However, jurisdiction is limited under these statutes
to causes of action arising solely from the use of the car or plane.
If a nonresident motorist were to assault someone while in the state,
the courts presently lack authority to determine his liability unless
he consented to jurisdiction or was served in this state. These alter-
natives are highly improbable considering the time involved in com-
mencing an action and a person's usual reluctance to be involved
in a lawsuit.
OWNERSHIP OF REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTY
The provision asserting jurisdiction on the basis of a nonres-
ident's relationship to property located within the state is restricted
to those actions arising out of the ownership, use, or possession of
real or personal property within the state. As such, it is outweighed
in importance by the overlapping clauses dealing with the "trans-
action of business" and the commission of a "tortious act" within
the state. It is under these latter provisions that most of the cases
have been decided.
Under the ownership provision of its long-arm statute, Illinois.
sustained jurisdiction over a former tenant who at the time of service
35 Turner v. Superior Court, 218 Cal. App. 2d 468, 32 Cal. Rptr. 717 (1963).
36 Sylvester v. King Mfg. Co., 256 Cal. App. 2d 236, 64 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1967).
37 Smith v. Smith, 45 Cal. 2d 235, 288 P.2d 497 (1955); Hartford v. Superior
Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956); Miller v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App.
2d 779, 16 Cal. Rptr. 36 (1961).
38 While these decisions dealt with corporate defendants the courts failed to find
that fact determinative.
39 CAL. VEH. CODE § 17451 (West Supp. 1968). This statute limits jurisdiction to
those causes of action arising from any accident resulting from the operation of the
motor vehicle within the state.
40 CAL. PUB. Urn.. CoDE § 21414 (West 1965). This statute limits jurisdiction to
those causes of action arising from any accident resulting from the operation of the
aircraft within the state.
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resided out-of-state.4' While in that case the defendant had lived in
an apartment for two years, the court considered that any term of
occupancy, even if for one month was sufficient to render defendant
amenable to out-of-state process.
Under present law, if a nonresident were to enter a short term
lease for a vacation cottage located in California, he would not be
considered a domiciliary and could not be compelled to defend an
action in California arising out of his use of the property. Section
418 would solve this problem. The vacationer by his possession of
the property during his visit would be subject to process although
he was no longer physically present within the state. Since he has
benefited from the laws of California while living here, it seems
inequitable to allow him to escape obligations he has voluntarily
assumed.4"
The proposed clause would also subject the nonresident to
jurisdiction for any action arising out of his ownership, use, or
possession of personal property within the state.4 3 This provision
is akin to the nonresident motorist statute by which a person is
deemed to have consented to jurisdiction by driving his car in this
state. Under section 418 the same rationale would apply. Whether
this section will have any practical effect is questionable since most
causes of action arising out of the ownership of personal property
will fall within the "transaction of business" or "tortious act"
provisions.
CONTRACTING TO INSURE AND SALES OF GOODS, WARES AND
MERCHANDISE
The first part of proposed section 418(a)(4)44 would seem to
be merely a codification of existing law.4 5 When an extrastate in-
surer contracts with a California insured, the company is subject to
California's jurisdiction even though it has no other business con-
tacts within the state. 6
The second part of proposed section 418(a)(4)47 subjects the
insurer to California jurisdiction where he knows, or should know,
41 Porter v. Nahas, 35 111. App. 2d 360, 182 N.E.2d 915 (1962).
Id. at 365, 182 N.E.2d at 917.
43 This section is unique to California's proposed long-arm statute.
44 See note 8 supra.
45 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). The court held that
the state (California) has an interest in providing redress for its residents when non-
resident insurers refuse to pay claims. Thus the mere fact that the policy was issued
to a California resident was a sufficient jurisdictional base.
46 F. JAMES, CIvIs. PROCEDURE 641-42 (1965).
47 See note 8 supra.
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that the insured person or item will be brought into California, and
should be upheld by the California courts. In light of the language
in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company48 that commer-
cial transactions are expanding rapidly and are often carried on by
parties separated by many states, and also considering the implied
consent statute regarding insurance companies, 9 California should
assert jurisdiction in these situations. Such power can be based
either on the theory that insurance companies are traditionally reg-
ulated by the states,50 or on the theory that the insurer knew the
covered items would be used in California and because of this will
be availing himself of the benefits of the state's law and should
not be allowed to escape liability simply because the contract was
not executed in this state."' For example, a California merchant
who purchases goods in distant states and insures them with a non-
resident insurance company, is certain to let the insurer know the
goods will be brought into California, regardless of whether the
insurer ever solicited business in California.52
Proposed section 418(a)(5)"3 gives the California courts per-
sonal jurisdiction over the nonresident when he sells goods, wares,
or merchandise to persons within this state. Since this section does
not appear in similar long-arm statutes, the apparent intention of the
draftsmen was to reach those people otherwise exempt from juris-
diction by the interpretations given to the "transaction of business"
and "tortious act" provisions of the long-arm statute. If the Cal-
ifornia courts interpret "transaction of business" with the same
breadth accorded "doing business,"54 that is, as broadly as due
process allows, then section 418(a) (5) will be of limited value as a
separate jurisdictional base since selling goods constitutes the "trans-
action of business."
In addition to enumerating jurisdictional events, the proposed
long-arm statute clarifies certain procedural matters. For example,
the new statute would not preclude establishing jurisdiction on the
grounds contained in existing statutes such as the residence or im-
plied consent statutes.55 In the case of the nonresident individual,
48 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
49 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-20 (West 1955); 15 U.S.C. § 1011 allows state reg-
ulation of insurance companies.
50 SEC v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co. of America, 359 U.S. 65, 68-9 (1959).
51 McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223-24 (1957).
52 Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176
N.E.2d 761 (1961), held that the defendant knew that his valves would be used in
another state, and that such use would benefit from that state's laws. This benefit
is the basis for making him liable to personal jurisdiction.
53 See note 8 supra.
54 Fisher Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 347, 347 P.2d 1 (1959).
55 CAL. INS. CODE §§ 1610-13 (nonresident insurance company) ; CAL. VEH. CODE
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however, the existing statutes provide limited jurisdictional bases,
and the proposed statute would become the major source of power.
Furthermore, section 418(b) would prevent joinder of any action
not arising from any of the jurisdictional events mentioned in sec-
tion 418(a) with a cause of action arising from section 418(a). It
appears that this section was added to protect the defendant from
being subject to jurisdiction unless the traditional notions of "fair
play and substantial justice" are met.56 One California appellate
court decision, construing section 411, has refused jurisdiction by
apparently requiring the cause of action to be related to the busi-
ness transacted within the state." Yet, neither the United States nor
the California Supreme Court requires such a stringent construction
of the "minimum contacts" theory."'
CONCLUSION
At present, California jurisdiction over individuals is based on
domicile and implied consent. Such concepts are not only outdated
but, in the case of a nonresident, support jurisdiction in relatively
infrequent situations. Proposed section 418 would join California
in the ranks of progressive states which base jurisdiction on a per-
son's purposeful relationship with the state. Moreover, California
citizens would enjoy much greater opportunity to litigate their rights
in the most convenient, and sometimes, only available forum.
Richard A. Barsotti
§ 17451 (nonresident motorist act); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21414 (nonresident fliers
act); CAL. CORP. CODE § 15700 (nonresident partnerships); Walrus Mfg. Co. v. New
Amsterdam Gas Co., 184 F. Supp. 214, 217-18 (S.D. Ill. 1960) (construing the Illinois
statute): ". . . personal jurisdiction may be acquired otherwise than by means of
Ill. CA. § 17 for a cause of action not enumerated therein."
56 "[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judg-
ment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
57 Buckeye Boiler Co. v. Superior Court, 269 A.C.A. 129, 74 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1969),
hearing granted, 70 A.C. 4 (Minutes, April 28, 1969).
58 Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Fisher
Governor Co. v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. 2d 347, 347 P.2d 1 (1959).
1969]

